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A. Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

B. They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action

C. You should vote negative:

Decisionmaking—debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and **implement an alternative politics.** The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a **substantive policy discussion.** Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an **institutional lever** with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political **system as a whole**, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to **participate directly in politics themselves**; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan itself**, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the **objections against particular projects** was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to **formulate an alternative politics**, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. **On the other hand**, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The **lively debate** stimulated by grassroots groups and parties **keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.**

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate.** They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to **challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making**. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the **contribution of grassroots** environmental **groups has been significant.** As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues **has been tremendous**.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 **Policy concessions** and new legal provisions for citizen participation **have not quelled grassroots action.** The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Unconditional environmental justice destroys policy priorities, tanking any risk analysis because they try to INCLUDE all viewpoints WITHOUT LIMITS

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Conceptual Drawbacks of Environmental Justice From a rationalizing perspective, a major problem with the environmental justice version of the democratizing critique is that, like ecopopulism more generally, it threatens to worsen the problem of environmental policy's missing priorities. As Walter Rosenbaum elaborates: like the man who mounted his horse and galloped off in all directions, the EPA has no constant course. With responsibility for administering nine separate statutes and parts of four others, the EPA has no clearly mandated priorities, no way of allocating scarce resources among different statutes or among programs within a single law. Nor does the EPA have a congressional charter, common to most federal departments and agencies, defining its broad organizational mission and priorities.... Congress has shown little inclination to provide the EPA with a charter or mandated priorities, in good part because the debate sure to arise on the relative merit and urgency of different environmental problems is an invitation to a political bloodletting most legislators would gladly avoid. Intense controversy would be likely among states, partisans of different ecological issues, and regulated interests over which problems to emphasize; the resulting political brawl would upset existing policy coalitions that themselves were fashioned with great difficulty. Moreover, setting priorities invites a prolonged, bitter debate over an intensely emotional issue: should the primary objective of environmental protection be to reduce public risks associated with environmental degradation as much as seems practical or—as many environmentalists fervently believe—is the goal to eliminate all significant forms of pollution altogether?18 Environmental justice inevitably enlarges this challenge of missing priorities, and for similar reasons. As noted earlier, the movement is a delicate coalition of local and ethnic concerns unable to narrow its grievances for fear of a similar "political bloodletting."1? Overt de-emphasis or removal of any issue or claim would prompt the affected coalition members (for example, groups, communities, or tribes) to disrupt or depart it. And chances are they would not leave quietly but with evident resentment and perhaps accusatory rhetoric directed at the persons and organizations remaining. Real priority-setting runs contrary to radical egalitarian value premises, and no one (perhaps least of all a strong democratizer) wants to be deemed a victimizer. Therefore movement rhetoric argues that no community should be harmed and that all community concerns and grievances deserve redress. Scholar-activist Robert Bullard proposes that "the solution to unequal protection lies in the realm of environmental justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, should be allowed to become a 'sacrifice zone."20 When pressed about the need for environmental risk priorities, and about how to incorporate environmental justice into priority setting, Bullard's answer is a vague plea for nondiscrimination, along with a barely more specific call for a "federal 'fair environmental protection act™ that would transform "protection from a privilege to a right."21 Bullard's position is fanciful and self-contradictory, but extremely telling. He argues essentially that the way to establish environmental priorities is precisely by guaranteeing that such priorities are impossible to implement. This is symptomatic of a movement for which untrammeled citizen voice and overall social equity are cardinal values. Bullard's position also epitomizes the desire of movement intellectuals to avoid speaking difficult truths (at least in public) to their allies and constituents. Ironically, in matters of health and risk, environmental justice poses a potentially serious, if generally unrecognized, danger to the minority and low-income communities it aspires to help. By discouraging citizens from thinking in terms of health and risk priorities (that is, by taking the position, in effect, that every chemical or site against which community outrage can be generated is equally hazardous), environmental justice can deflect attention from serious hazards to less serious or perhaps trivial ones.

## case

#### Nuclear technocracy’s key to effect change

Nordhaus 11, chairman – Breakthrough Instiute, and Shellenberger, president – Breakthrough Insitute, MA cultural anthropology – University of California, Santa Cruz, 2/25/‘11

(Ted and Michael, <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/the_long_death_of_environmenta>)

Tenth, we are going to have to get over our suspicion of technology, especially nuclear power. There is **no credible path** to reducing global carbon emissions without an enormous expansion of nuclear power. It is the only low carbon technology we have today with the demonstrated capability to generate large quantities of centrally generated electrtic power. It is the low carbon of technology of choice for much of the rest of the world. Even uber-green nations, like Germany and Sweden, have reversed plans to phase out nuclear power as they have begun to reconcile their energy needs with their climate commitments. Eleventh, we will need to embrace again the role of the state as a direct provider of public goods. The modern environmental movement, borne of the new left rejection of social authority of all sorts, has embraced the notion of state regulation and even creation of private markets while largely rejecting the generative role of the state. In the modern environmental imagination, government promotion of technology - whether nuclear power, the green revolution, synfuels, or ethanol - almost always ends badly. Never mind that virtually the entire history of American industrialization and technological innovation is the story of government investments in the development and commercialization of new technologies. Think of a transformative technology over the last century - computers, the Internet, pharmaceutical drugs, jet turbines, cellular telephones, nuclear power - and what you will find is government investing in those technologies at a scale that private firms simply cannot replicate. Twelveth, big is beautiful. The rising economies of the developing world will continue to develop whether we want them to or not. The solution to the ecological crises wrought by modernity, technology, and progress will be more modernity, technology, and progress. The solutions to the ecological challenges faced by a planet of 6 billion going on 9 billion will not be decentralized energy technologies like solar panels, small scale organic agriculture, and a drawing of unenforceable boundaries around what remains of our ecological inheritance, be it the rainforests of the Amazon or the chemical composition of the atmosphere. Rather, these solutions will be: large central station power technologies that can meet the energy needs of billions of people increasingly living in the dense mega-cities of the global south without emitting carbon dioxide, further intensification of industrial scale agriculture to meet the nutritional needs of a population that is not only growing but eating higher up the food chain, and a whole suite of new agricultural, desalinization and other technologies for gardening planet Earth that might allow us not only to pull back from forests and other threatened ecosystems but also to create new ones. The New Ecological Politics The great ecological challenges that our generation faces demands an ecological politics that is **generative, not restrictive.** An ecological politics capable of addressing global warming will require us to reexamine virtually every prominent strand of post-war green ideology. From Paul Erlich's warnings of a population bomb to The Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth," contemporary ecological politics have consistently embraced green Malthusianism despite the fact that the Malthusian premise has persistently failed for the better part of three centuries. Indeed, the green revolution was exponentially increasing agricultural yields at the very moment that Erlich was predicting mass starvation and the serial predictions of peak oil and various others resource collapses that have followed have continue to fail. This does not mean that Malthusian outcomes are impossible, but neither are they inevitable. **We do have a choice** in the matter, but it is not the choice that greens have long imagined. The choice that humanity faces is not whether to constrain our growth, development, and aspirations or die. It is whether we will continue to innovate and accelerate technological progress in order to thrive. Human technology and ingenuity have repeatedly confounded Malthusian predictions yet green ideology continues to cast a suspect eye towards the very technologies that have allowed us to avoid resource and ecological catastrophes. But such solutions will require environmentalists to abandon the "small is beautiful" ethic that has also characterized environmental thought since the 1960's. We, the most secure, affluent, and thoroughly modern human beings to have ever lived upon the planet, must abandon both the dark, zero-sum Malthusian visions and the idealized and nostalgic fantasies for a simpler, more bucolic past in which humans lived in harmony with Nature.

#### Mills doesn’t have any METHODOLOGY for determining truism – can’t determine who is deceived

Cormier 7

Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance

Ed. Shannon Sullivan, Nancy Tuana

Associate Professor, Stony Brook Ph.D. Harvard University, 1992 M.A. University of Houston, 1982 B.A. University of Houston, 1982 Harriman Hall 237 Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750 Tel: (631) 632-7572 Harvey.Cormier@stonybrook.edu Areas of Interest Kantian ethics; Nietzschean arguments against morality; pragmatic ethics; animal rights; justifications for affirmative action; realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic theories of truth; concepts of knowledge and objectivity connected with these; pragmatism versus neo-pragmatism; philosophy and literature, Nelson Goodman's and Arthur Danto's philosophies of art, Marx-influenced theories of art and culture; ancient skepticism and stoicism; "Black philosophy" and arguments for the reality of "race" and against individualism; Cornel West's "prophetic pragmatism"; Peter Singer's comparisons of racism with "speciesism" Harvey Cormier's dissertation was on the work of the psychologist and pragmatist philosopher William James. His work since then has taken on diverse subject matters such as Cornel West's Marx-influenced criticisms of James; Nietzsche on freedom and selfhood; the idea that Henry James the novelist was a pragmatist like his brother William; and the film 2001: A Space Odyssey considered as a work of modernist art. Cormier's book, The Truth Is What Works: William James, Pragmatism, and the Seed of Death (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), attributes to James the "Forrest Gump theory of truth," or the simple but profound idea that truth, like stupidity, is as it does or tends to do. Cormier thinks that this Darwinian "functionalist" approach to epistemology is the best one, and he is interested in the bearing of this idea on questions concerning psychology, evolution, human identity, and morality

However, it is worth emphasizing that, in Mills's view, simply being nonwhite will not make a person conscious of this reality any more than being white will make a person unconscious of it. True, white "renegades" will be unable to refuse the Contract entirely and see things entirely from the nonwhite point of view, since "mere skin color will automatically continue to privilege them" (Mills 1997, 107). But, in general, race will not work straightforwardly as a lens that will cither obscure or show us the true reality. Hence, while the same metaproblem that confronts Orwell and Marx may not trouble Mills, Mills will still have to deal with a variant of it. Maybe it will not be hard for a given black person to explain how she and certain other black people have avoided false race consciousness and the white man's epistemological traps; maybe it will be easy for her to see how other blacks got turned into Toms, Oreos, and incognegroes by ideological indoctrination. But there will linger for her, as she explains her knowledge in terms of "reality," the problem of explaining how she can tell which black people are the victims of ideology and which arc not. Indeed, this may be the most epistemologically compelling issue connected to Mills's problem. Racial Contract theory suggests that certain blacks, especially educated blacks in the West, will be hard-pressed not to play their own supporting role in the ideology of white domination, this even despite experiencing disadvantages every day under white supremacy. How have some of them—I guess I should say "some of us"— Something like this is really the fundamental epistemological problem at the bottom of the other mctaproblems. If I and someone else can be confronted with the same reality but come up with two different theories of what is going on right in front of us, then how can I be sure that mine is the theory free of "ideology"? And in this context, it is especially striking that the blacks insisting on the reality of race and racial differences are the ones claiming to have evaded indoctrination. Should they really be so confident of having escaped the intellectual domination of the racists? Maybe this question will seem like just the kind of thing that only either a white ideologue or a miscducated black would ask. Willingness to waste time on such an abstract debate about relations between theories and reality may seem "symptomatic rather than diagnostic" of the realworld race problem, as Mills says of one possible position in this debate, postmodernist irony concerning meaning and truth (Mills 1997, 129). After all, the real causes and effects of both deception and racism are right there in front of us, obvious to any observer, or at least any observer of color ... but then, that's just the issue, isn't it? To suppose that reality answers this question is to beg the question, taking for granted what has to be proven. This is the general problem of appeals to ideology, screens of thought behind which reality hides. It is not necessarily an insoluble problem, even if we use only the means Mills uses to solve the (non"mcta") problem of why Westerners can't see the world in front of them. One might in fact have to argue in a circle, but it would not necessarily be a xricious circle; a big enough circle that took enough concrete details about power relations into account could imaginably explain not only our blindness to the obvious but also our blindness to our obvious blindness to the obvious. Still, I think that there is a better way of dealing with the metaproblcm than starting to look for appearances that screen off appearances, the ulterior motives that hide the ulterior motives, and the ideology that hides the ideology. Instead we can dispense with talk of ideology altogether. Orwell's, Marx's, and Mills's problems, which together amount to the problem of how we know so litde though we experience so much, and Plato's problem, the problem of how we know so much though we experience so litde, are two sides of the same coin—a coin that once was valuable but now is not really worth that much. I think of the "postmodern" philosophical view known as pragmatism as preeminendy an effort to dissolve Plato's problem rather than solve it, to show that our human capacity for infinite knowledge of laws and rules needs to be questioned more than it needs to be explained; and I think that once Plato's problem loses its grip on our imagination, Orwell's problem begins to lose its grip too. We human beings do have remarkable capacities for cooperation, mutual understanding, and the making and sharing of intellectual tools, but the pragmatist thinks that we can understand those capacities without reference to any ostensible ability to look past the world of our little experiences and struggles. And once we accept this anti-Platonist point and get out of the habit of trying to look past our life of making up and sharing ideas, we will be less impressed by Chomsky's, Orwell's, Marx's, and Mills's idea that our intellectual life may amount to a big lie that stops us from noticing reality. Of course, that will not entail that our current understanding of the political world, or of anything else, is all just fine; and it certainly will not entail that there is no need for big changes in the way the races, classes, and genders are related politically. But the grounds for criticism of that understanding and of the world will have to change to healthier and more (small r) realistic grounds, grounds that have more to do with what human beings want out of life than with what there just is in the world of "obvious fact."

#### Pragmatism outweighs – racial contract theory fails placing ontology before results. DIALOGUE is still POSSIBLE

Cormier 7

Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance

Ed. Shannon Sullivan, Nancy Tuana

Associate Professor, Stony Brook Ph.D. Harvard University, 1992 M.A. University of Houston, 1982 B.A. University of Houston, 1982 Harriman Hall 237 Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750 Tel: (631) 632-7572 Harvey.Cormier@stonybrook.edu Areas of Interest Kantian ethics; Nietzschean arguments against morality; pragmatic ethics; animal rights; justifications for affirmative action; realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic theories of truth; concepts of knowledge and objectivity connected with these; pragmatism versus neo-pragmatism; philosophy and literature, Nelson Goodman's and Arthur Danto's philosophies of art, Marx-influenced theories of art and culture; ancient skepticism and stoicism; "Black philosophy" and arguments for the reality of "race" and against individualism; Cornel West's "prophetic pragmatism"; Peter Singer's comparisons of racism with "speciesism" Harvey Cormier's dissertation was on the work of the psychologist and pragmatist philosopher William James. His work since then has taken on diverse subject matters such as Cornel West's Marx-influenced criticisms of James; Nietzsche on freedom and selfhood; the idea that Henry James the novelist was a pragmatist like his brother William; and the film 2001: A Space Odyssey considered as a work of modernist art. Cormier's book, The Truth Is What Works: William James, Pragmatism, and the Seed of Death (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), attributes to James the "Forrest Gump theory of truth," or the simple but profound idea that truth, like stupidity, is as it does or tends to do. Cormier thinks that this Darwinian "functionalist" approach to epistemology is the best one, and he is interested in the bearing of this idea on questions concerning psychology, evolution, human identity, and morality

The project of truth-, world-, and self-making that the pragmatists are trying to jump-start is at bottom a matter of the choices and interests of individuals in localities, and this means that it does lack some of the world-historical sweep, drama, and grandeur that the descendents of Marx look for in their philosophical understandings of things. Throughout The American Evasion of Philosophy, West makes it clear that he admires the kind of romantic, world-transforming urge that he finds in both Emerson and Marx (West 1989,10-11). Gramsci complained disdainfully that the Rotary Club was about the best thing that had come out of the pragmatic movement (Gramsci 1971, 373). But though the project of being what we are is one that we must begin alone or in small groups, we can elect to join like-minded individuals to do battle— intellectual, political, or even military battle, if need be—with individuals of different minds, or with others who have not become what they are and wiio are still just social products. We don't have to stay alone, and we wont if we can share our ideas. As part of the groups that we choose to help create—Rotary Clubs, maybe (they actually do a lot of good internationally), but also university faculties, hospital staffs and administrations, disaster-relief organizations, groups of volunteers in public schools, labor unions, political parties, army regiments, nations, nonbiological "races," and, perhaps someday, if we're lucky, even the "human race"—wre individuals can make large changes in the world. Human society can act as an amplifier for individuals' efforts, and with some cooperation a Martin Luther King, a Henry Ford, or a Josef Stalin can leave quite a footprint—for better or worse. But as the pragmatist tries to make her own mark on the world, she will not ever see herself as peeking over inaccurate representations at the dark power relations that are sweeping her along. The wrords and thoughts of particular, unique persons give them power in the world— that is why they bother to generate them—and the wrorld is therefore not a thing independent of those thoughts. We do not live behind a screen, or even in a QuinianNeurathian boat, of true or false appearances. We live right there in the world, and we have better and worse thought-tools to use in shaping that world. And starting to think of ourselves in this way will help us take advantage of that world-shaping power. This is the real political meaning of both Emerson's and James's prophetic exhortations. Emerson and James do not tell us about beings with a given social nature requiring democracy, nor are they only advising us of the evils of conservatism. They are provoking us, stirring us out of our socially induced torpor, so that we will make ourselves into political beings and then do specific moral and political things. They advocate in their philosophy no specific specific practices, and James's worries about truth may therefore seem to be no more than a lot of socially indifferent protoprofessionalism; but James is in fact enjoining us individuals, whoever we may be and whenever we may exist, to try to be more than just a part of the whole, to be real entities in our own right and to act in our own behalf. He is not ignoring social groupings; he is trying to provoke us to create and contribute to those groups and to the wrorld as a whole, to make our specific differences there, thus And Rorty is carrying on James's provocation without quite appreciating it. Where both West and Rorty himself see a tedious struggle for the minds of a few professors, James would see part of the pragmatic battle to keep individual minds open, active, and free in a changing world. Rorty has expressed bewilderment concerning the worldwide popularity of his own work; he cannot figure out why his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, wrhich advocates no specific political or moral positions, and wrhich Rorty sees as an effort to talk to a few professional philosophers about a lot of dusty issues, was translated into Bulgarian (Rorty 1995, 56-71). The answer is that the pragmatists, including Rorty, may not offer eternal truth about truth, but they do offer an eternal challenge. They have become the best-known and most successful philosophical figures in American history by challenging their readers, even readers in very different places and times—even in Bulgaria!—to think for themselves and thus become fit for life in democracy, Neither Plato's problem nor Orwell's will trouble us much on the way to this kind of democracy of individuals. Once we take on the task of building truths as we go rather than grasping them, the appearance-reality distinction, on which both of these problems depend, begins to seem not only dubious but—much more important—trivial. ("False" is important, but "unimportant" is more important.) We begin to feel that there are only less useful claims and more useful ones. We will inevitably hold the less useful ones from time to time, but we will dispose of them wrhen we find ones that work better. Many of today's "objective truths" will become tomorrowr's "mere appearances" when more helpful beliefs turn up, and the same thing will happen the day after tomorrow. Even some of that infinite knowledge of the world beyond our limited experience—Euclid's parallel postulate, for one standard example—will amount to no more than rules that seemed good to follow for a while, ways of talking and acting that seemed as if they would pay off forever but did not. And after this happens enough, we will realize, to adapt an idea from both T. H. Green and Jesus in the Gospel of Mark, that the rules of thought are made for us, not we for the rules of thought. We will cease looking for the innate endowment that makes it possible for us to look into a ready-made infinite. What's more, the flip side of this problem, our ignorance of the world that is present to our experience, will begin to seem less compelling as well, since the very ideas of "experience" and "the world' that figure in this formulation will begin to make less sense. After we realize that no one has access to a world beyond all of those deceptive appearances, the issues of what structures of deception are hiding that world from us will not seem urgent. Neither will the meta-issue of how certain persons, or perhaps certain persons of color, managed to see through those structures. After we have these pragmatic insights, we will not see anything particularly promising about an epistemology of ignorance. We are all ignorant of many things, even "obvious facts," thanks to misperceptions, unquestioned preconceptions, common misconceptions, everyday irrationalities, limited experience, crippling neuroses, white lies and black, half-truths, propaganda, convenient self-deception . .. the usual suspects. No systematic study will reveal the structures of our foolishness. The ignorant people of the world include even people such as Chomsky, Marx, Orwell, and Mills, who have new, different, and potentially helpful ideas about how we should describe our societies and our histories. No one's ideas, not even those of Chomsky or Mills, are warranted by their closeness to the really objective reality. This is not, of course, to say that we should just think whatever we like. Chomsky may well be right to argue that we should be more skeptical of the mainstream media, and Mills may be right to argue that we should be skeptical of blithe appeals to universality in political philosophy. Maybe it is true that there is not so much difference between Republicans and Democrats as we might think, and it may be true that, under present circumstances, political philosophy would benefit if it paid more attention to the ways in which persons of color, women, and the poor have historically been judged to be of substandard rationality. Criticism is possible according to a pragmatic outlook, and neither believers in radical new theories nor believers in moribund old ones are trapped in their own discrete language games. The ideas traded in criticism and debate, especially the true ideas we did not have before, can give us power. They are useful tools, which is why we want them and why we trade them. If a novel reconception of mainstream politics or human rationality actually makes life, thought, and the world better, then that reconception will be true, or it will at least have the only kind of truth we are interested in getting. But it remains to be seen whose newr ideas actually improve things. Maybe it remains eternally to be seen, so that no philosophical closing of these questions by appeal to what is already real and present will ever be possible. Emersonian philosophy of a Jamesian-Rortian type, far from trapping us in our old ways of thinking, is in fact designed to encourage us to take an experimental, let's-try-this-on approach to new ideas. It does this by showing us what we have to gain by getting things right, and it even takes some of the sting away from the very idea of getting things wrong. Getting things wrong, being ignorant, is not a matter of betraying logical, material, or racial reality; getting things wrong on the way to getting things right is just what we do as we try to make things better, we makers and remakers of ourselves and the world.

#### Siting decisions based on non-racial factors – best evidence

Kevin 97

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Nondiscriminatory factors account for disparate results in the great majority of formal siting decisions. Some hazardous waste landfill sites which are often cited as examples of environmental racism, such as Emelle, Alabama and Warren County, North Carolina, may be technically superior to alternate sites. n92 For example, when Chemical Waste Management made its decision to site a hazardous waste landfill, Emelle was the only county east of the Mississippi River evaluated by EPA and listed as one of the ten most desirable counties for a landfill. n93 Factors accounting for its desirability as a landfill included the sparse population surrounding the site, reliable access to the site, and arid temperature in the site's location. n94 Most importantly, Emelle was underlain by dense natural chalk forming a good barrier between waste disposal activities and aquifers. n95 Other factors being equal, and independent of racism, siting proponents seek out areas where the costs of siting are low relative to comparable areas. n96 Minority communities are often in areas [\*140] with lower land values. n97 In addition, although the assertion that "no one likes to live near a waste site" n98 is probably correct, in some instances there has not been strong opposition from minority communities that have been or would be affected by a LULU siting. n99 It is reasonable to conclude that lack of opposition has resulted from the same factors that have been cited in the cases of white communities which have solicited LULUs; as well as potential problems, LULUs can bring potential benefits to communities in jobs, revenues and direct provision of social services. n100 In some cases, not only has there been a lack of local opposition to LULU sitings, but community leaders have actively sought out or welcomed such sitings. For example, the Campo Band of Mission Indians has supported the construction of a solid waste landfill on reservation land in San Diego County, California. n101 Permitting and environmental standards for the landfill would meet, at a minimum, applicable EPA standards. n102 The landfill [\*141] would bring great economic benefits to the Campo Band. n103 Tribal sources estimated that the landfill would directly create at least fifty-five permanent jobs for at least thirty-five members of the Campo Band, almost eliminating tribal unemployment. n104 Here, the most sustained and politically effective opposition to siting the landfill has come from several white neighbors of the Campo Reservation. n105 Unfortunately, LULUs have been sited despite considerable opposition from minority communities. Siting in the face of local opposition, however, is not limited to minority communities. A prominent example of LULU siting in spite of objections from non-minority communities is the decision to place a high-level radioactive waste repository in Nevada. n106 Conversely, other communities with white majorities have lobbied to have facilities, which most people would consider to be LULUs, sited in their jurisdictions in order to gain jobs and other benefits during difficult economic times. n107 In both situations, non-racial factors better explain the outcomes than intentional or societal racism.

#### We have the best SYNTHESIS of studies

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Christopher Boerner and Thomas Lambert have observed that many studies suffer from severe methodological difficulties or are too limited in scope to reliably indicate broader patterns.66 Indeed, once contrary findings and thoughtful criticisms are taken adequately into account, even a reasonably generous reading of the foundational empirical research alleging environmental inequity along racial lines must leave room for profound skepticism regarding the reported results. Taken as a whole this research offers, at best, only tenuous support for the hypothesis of racial inequity in siting or exposure, and no insight into the crucial issues of risk and health impact.

#### Can’t solve the scale of analysis problem

Kevin 97

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As one commentator concluded, "notwithstanding the growing significance of the environmental justice movement, few rigorous studies have been conducted that satisfactorily establish a statistically significant correlation between a community's race and socioeconomic status and its exposure to disproportionate environmental risks or impacts." n61 There are sufficiently important methodological problems with some of the more prominent studies that many environmental justice advocates rely upon to warrant caution in accepting claims of disproportionality at face value. A study by Douglas Anderton, et. al (Anderton Study) of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities in the United States that opened for business prior to 1990 and were still open in 1992, and about which data could be found on the level of census [\*134] tracts (about eighty-five percent of such facilities), came to very different conclusions than the UCC and other studies cited by many environmental justice advocates. n62 The Anderton Study found that there were no statistically significant differences between the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics in census tracts with TSDFs and in tracts without such facilities. n63 In other words, there was no correlation between the presence of these minority groups and the presence of a TSDF. n64 The study also found that there were statistically significant correlations between the presence of a TSDF and the following socioeconomic factors: lower employment rate of males, employment in industrial occupations and lower housing values, as compared with non-TSDF tracts. n65 Of these factors, "the most significant and consistent effect on TSDF location of those [factors] ... considered is that TSDFs are located in areas with larger proportions of workers employed in industrial activities, a finding that is consistent with a plausibly rational motivation to locate near other industrial facilities or markets." n66 The discrepancies between the results of the Anderton Study and the findings of the UCC Study stem from the differences in geographic units of analysis chosen by the researchers. n67 The zip code areas used in the UCC Study are larger than the census tracts used in the Anderton Study. The use of these larger units increases the percentage of Blacks in particular. The Anderton Study found that when census tracts within a two and a half mile radius of TSDFs were aggregated, the percentage of black residents was greater than the percentage of Blacks in census tracts containing TSDFs. n68 [\*135] There are no firm guidelines on how to define the geographic extent of areas that are potentially affected, in terms of health, property values and other indicators, by the presence of TSDFs. However, it is likely that data derived from census tracts produce more defensible statistical results than do data based on zip code areas. Accordingly, it is likely that the Anderton Study is more reliable than the UCC Study. n69 Census tracts are designed to be homogeneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status and living conditions. n70 In contrast, zip code areas are basically geographic designations, intended to maximize the transportation efficiency of postal deliveries. n71 Thus, any homogeneity within zip codes is fortuitous, rather than being present by design. Assuming that greater impacts are experienced by individuals closer to a TSDF, census tracts containing a TSDF would logically bear the greatest potential burdens. If there is no correlation between minority populations and TSDFs within census tracts, then the core environmental justice arguments that minorities are targeted for the siting of TSDFs and that minorities disproportionately bear the burdens of such siting are weakened. If a larger percentage of minorities are found within a radius of several miles of TSDFs than is found in the national population, this is arguably due to the larger percentages of minorities in industrial areas in general, which occurs regardless of the presence of TSDFs.

#### Data matters – they don’t solve

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

For environmental justice to contribute measurably to public health in low-income and minority communities, it would almost certainly have to stress an epidemiologic perspective (even in connection with regulatory matters) to a far greater extent than is currently the case. Activism would have to begin with effects and then support honest, analytically defensible assessments of causal factors. But given the overriding concern with citizen mobilization and participation, the continuing focus on citizen fears and frustrations, and the strong incentives for those persons engaged in this activity to continue it, any such shift in perspective would be difficult to achieve.

#### Coal turns environmental racism – plus worse risk of cancer

Energy Justice Network No Date Given

(“Coal Ash,” <http://www.energyjustice.net/coal/ash>)

**Coal ash is the waste product left over from burning coal**. It is almost entirely unregulated, high in heavy metals, and every year energy companies generate more than 150 million tons of it. While most waste reduction efforts target residential recycling and sometimes construction debris, coal ash is the second largest waste stream in the United States and can be found in 47 states. The ash is disposed of in lagoons (wet pits), landfills (dry pits), and mine pits. It can and has leaked from all of these types of dump sites .

After a devastating coal ash spill in December 2008 in Harriman, TN major news outlets began to take notice.

The outlets asked basic, yet revealing questions – What is coal ash? Where is it stored? How is it stored? How does it affect communities when it spills or leaks? Is it regulated?

The answers are alarming. Coal ash contains boron, cadmium, selenium, mercury, arsenic, chromium, and other dangerous elements. The ash is often stored in large unmaintained surface impoundments, ponds, and abandoned mine sites. There are more than 180 known sites that store this ash in unlined or partially lined pits. Coal ash accidents can take various forms from the collapse of a surface impoundment dam (as happened in TN) or in metals leaching into ground and drinking water. Leaking sites span Indiana, Georgia, South Carolina, New Mexico, Colorado, and Virginia. The list goes on. In 2007 the EPA confirmed 24 cases of leaking ash pits that resulted in contaminated water bodies. Then, in 2010 it had confirmed 67 leaking sites.

**These leaking sites pose a health threat to the communities in which they are located**. A risk assessment drafted by the EPA in August 2007, estimated that exposure to coal combustion waste (CCW) **raises an individual’s cancer risk 9x higher than smoking a pack of cigarettes a day**, and 900x higher than the ‘acceptable risk’ calculated under EPA’s regulatory framework (Source: Sierra Club) . The assessment found that of people who live near a coal ash site, **1 in 50 are diagnosed with cancer** from arsenic contamination (an ‘ingredient’ in coal ash). The In Harm's Way (PDF) report (2010) found that every single ash site equipped with groundwater monitors showed arsenic levels in exceedance of the federal drinking water standards. And as air pollution controls improve, the ash becomes more toxic since heavy metals such as mercury and arsenic are filtered out and collected in the ash.

Despite the EPA’s analysis confirming the adverse health effects of coal ash exposure, there are no federal regulations on the waste and coal ash is entirely unregulated in at least 20 states . On coal ash regulation, Sue Sturgis, investigative reporter with Facing South online magazine writes, “For example, most states don't require groundwater monitoring and runoff collection at coal ash impoundments, and more than half don't require liners or financial assurances to guarantee the owners can pay for cleanup of any contamination that might occur.”

Often **the waste is shipped to the cheapest**, **least regulated depository** - often **in low-income communities**. For instance, following the massive ash spill in Tennessee, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) began shipping its waste more than 300 miles south to Perry County, AL. In Perry County (where coal ash is entirely unregulated), residents found themselves the unconsulted hosts of 3 million tons of coal ash from Harriman, TN’s spill. The coal ash facility in Uniontown, AL is surrounded by three churches and 212 people within a radius of a mile and a half.

Run-off from its massive landfill is 80x the safe drinking water standard .

Uniontown is **88 percent African-American** and nearly half of its residents live below the poverty line – a fact that has raised questions about environmental injustice, including **environmental racism**.

Uniontown is just one of many low-income communities to sit beside a coal ash dump. An analysis of 44 sites the EPA lists as “high hazard” (where dam failure would likely cause loss of life), shows that 45 percent are in areas with large low-income populations. Though national poverty rates hover around 12 percent, several of the sites are situated in areas with poverty levels of 19, 20, and 29 percent. **Trends of environmental injustice based on race and class could be significantly more pronounced if the analysis** included sites that pose a threat due to leaching or if it **analyzed all coal ash sites**, **not only the ones identified as** “**high hazard**”.

#### Vogtle crucial to nuclear future

Haar 12

<http://decodedscience.com/the-first-u-s-nuclear-power-plant-licensed-in-three-decades/10734>

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Does nuclear power within the United States have a future? Two new nuclear power reactors have been approved for the Vogtle facility in Georgia, so it appears the answer is yes, at least for the moment, but the question still remains whether new technology and faster licensing meets all the expectations and requirements of nuclear inspectors.

#### Nuclear power expansion’s key to global desalination

Saly T. Panicker and P.K. Tewari 11, Desalination Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai, “Nuclear Energy for Water Desalination” in “Nuclear Energy Encyclopedia: Science, Technology, and Applications”, googlebooks

Water scarcity is one of the most pressing crises affecting our planet It is a global issue. Water is indispensable for industrial development, economic growth, social well-being, and for the preservation of natural resources. It is estimated that one-fifth of the worlds population does not have access to sate drinking water. Drinking water with physical, chemical, or biological contamination has harmful effects on human beings. Seawater. brackish water, and fresh water have different levels of salinity, which is normally expressed by the total dissolved solids (TDS> concentration. Water is considered potable when its TDS is below 500 parts per million (ppin) as per the World Health Organization (WHO\*. A virtually inexhaustible reserve of water exists in the sea, which is not fit for drinking.

Desalination is the process of producing pure water from saline water using electricity or heat. The major types of commercial desalination processes arc (a) thermal processes, such as multi-stage flash (MSI-"!, multiple-effect distillation (MED). vapor compression (VC). and low temperature evaporation (LTE), where heat energy is used to vaporize fresh water from saline water; and (b) membrane processes such as reverse osmosis (RO) and electro-dialysis (ED), where pure water is separated through suitable membranes using mechanical or electrical energy. Globally, about 60 million cubic meter/day (M3/d) of fresh water is produced hy desalination. The energy for these plants is generally supplied from the conventional fossil fuel power plants. However, the depleting sources and future price uncertainty of the fossil fuels promote production of energy from nuclear or renewable sources.

9.2 NUCLEAR DESALINATION

Desalination is an energy-intensive process. A desalination system, especially ihe thermal unit, can be integrated with a power plant for directly receiving steam, electricity, and coolant (scawatcr) return stream as feed. Co-location of desalination and power plants lias the henelits of sharing infrastructural facilities, which would lead to the reduction of overall costs. Such dual purpose plants generating power and water have inherent design strategies for better thermodynamic efficiency besides economic optimization. Production of potable water in a facility in which a nuclear reactor is used as the source of energy for the process is termed nuclear desalination. Tins energy could be low-grade steam (for MSF/MED), waste heal (for LTE), or electricity (for ROVED). Years of successful operation have proved the technical feasibility and reliability of nuclear desalination.

A power plan! coupled with a desalinaiion system utilizing only a pan of the total energy for producing water is known as a dual-purpose plain or a cogeneration plant. A power plant exclusively dedicated for water desalination is known as single-purpose plant. For a given power rating, a nuclear power plant, in general, has a larger amount of waste heat than a fossil fuel power plant. The enthalpy of steam available at the inlet to the high pressure (HP) turbine of a nuclear power plant is lower due to the lower pressure and temperature of the saturated steam. Thus, the specific steam consumption in a nuclear power plant is higher as compared to conventional power plant. This leads to availability of a higher amount of steam that could be utilized for desalination (Table 9.1). In addition, a nuclear power plant is normally situated in coastal areas, where the feed seawater is available nearby and also there is scarcity of good quality water.

Table 9.2 shows the parameters of steam, produced in various reactor types. A nuclear plant, depending on its type, can provide steam or process heat from about 50 to I50°C for desalination. Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) and High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (HTCiR) generate steam at higher temperature and pressure. LMFBRs produce steam at approximately 500°C and MTGRs at still higher temperatures.

93 WORLD SCENARIO OF NUCLEAR DESALINATION

The possibility of using nuclear energy for desalination of seawater was realized as early as the 1960s. Experience with nuclear desalination now exceeds 150 reactor-years. Table 9.3 gives a list of the nuclear plants used for desalination of water.

Nuclear desalination has been drawing broad interest among the member states of International Atomic Energ) Agency (IAEA) due to acute water issues in many arid and semi-arid areas worldwide. The IAEA is playing an important role as a facilitating agency for creating (lie awareness, coordinating research projects, identifying important topics of common interest, organizing technical meetings, and providing forums for exchange of information on nuclear desalination. Argentina is exploring the possibilities of using its small reactor. CAREM, for providing energy input to desalination system. China has completed the feasibility study of nuclear desalination project using the NHR-200 type of nuclear reactor. Egypt has completed a feasibility study for a nuclear co-generation plant at El-Dabaa. Construction of a pre-heal reverse osmosis (RO) lest facility at El-Dabaa has been completed. France has collaborations with III Libya to undertake lechno-economie feasibility study for a specific site ami the adaptation of the experimental reactor at Tajoura for nuclear desalination and (2) Morocco (The AMANE project) for techno-economic feasibility study of Agadir and Laayoun sites. In Japan, several nuclear reactors are integrated with desalination facilities. The Korean program includes development of an integrated desalination plant with SMART for electricity generation and scawater desalination. Pakistan is establishing an MED based nuclear desalination demonstration plant integrated with the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). The Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (ROSATOM) is constructing a floating barge mounted co-generation nuclear plant based on ship propulsion reactor KLT-40s of PWR type. Tunisia has completed techno-economic feasibility study for the la Skhira site in the southeast part

of the country. Nuclear desalination is one of the missions of U.S. Department of Energy's launched Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)'s Grid Appropriate Reactor (GAR) campaign. Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria. Brazil. Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq. Italy, Jordan. Lebanon. Philippines. Syrian Arab Republic, and the UAE are exploring the potential of nuclear desalination in their countries or regions.

#### Global water scarcity’s inevitable – kills billions

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

The battles of yesterday were fought over land. Those of today are over energy. But the battles of tomorrow may be over water. Along with population growth and increasing per capita water consumption, massive pollution of the world's surface water systems has placed a great strain on remaining supplies of clean fresh water. Global deforestation, destruction of wetlands, dumping of pesticides and fertilizer into waterways, and global warming are all taking a terrible toll on the Earth's fragile water system.

The combination of increasing demand and shrinking supply has attracted the interest of global corporations who want to sell water for a profit. The water industry is touted by the World Bank as a potential trillion-dollar industry. Water has become the “blue gold” of the 21st century.

In many parts of the world, one major river supplies water to multiple countries. Climate change, pollution and population growth are putting a significant strain on supplies. In some areas renewable water reserves are in danger of dropping below the 500 cubic meters per person per year considered a minimum for a functioning society.

In recent times, several studies around the globe show that climatic change is likely to impact significantly upon freshwater resources availability. In India, demand for water has already increased manifold over the years due to urbanization, agriculture expansion, increasing population, rapid industrialization and economic development. At present, changes in cropping pattern and land-use pattern, over-exploitation of water storage and changes in irrigation and drainage are modifying the hydrological cycle in many climate regions and river basins of India.

Due to warming and climate change rainfall trend has been badly affected worldwide. This change has adversely affected the groundwater recharge.

Water scarcity is expected to become an even more important problem than it is today.

In a case study of Jharkhand state of India groundwater recharging is mainly dependent on rainfall. Though Jharkhand receives sufficient amount of rainfall (900 to 1400 mm/year) but from last several years the rainfall pattern is very erratic. From last two years Ranchi city the capital of Jharkhand state received sufficient rainfall but distribution of rainfall was not uniform. It rained heavily just for two to three days in the month of August and September which resulted in heavy runoff and less infiltration affecting groundwater level.

The process of urbanization and industrialization from last 20 years has caused changes in the water table of Jharkhand State of India as a result of decreased recharge and increased withdrawal. Many of the small ponds which were main source of water in the surrounding areas are now filled for different construction purpose affecting the water table.

By 2100, water scarcity could impact between 1.1 and 3.2 billion people, says a leaked draft of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report due to be published in April 2007. The report focuses on the consequences of global warming and options for adapting to them. In February 2007 the panel released a report on the scientific basis of climate change.

The IPCC predicts critical water shortages in China and Australia, as well as parts of Europe and the United States. Africa and poor countries such as Bangladesh would be most affected because they were least able to cope with drought.

Major cities worldwide may face a water shortage crisis by 2050 if relevant governments don't react quickly. The water shortage will mostly affect basic daily needs such as drinking, cooking, bathing and washing clothes, and the poor residents of the world's major cities in developing countries are the ones who will suffer most.

"By 2050, big cities that will not have enough water available nearby include Beijing, New Delhi, Mexico City, Lagos and Tehran. China and India will be particularly hard hit unless significant new efforts are taken by their cities,".

There are several principal manifestations of the water crisis.

1. Inadequate access to safe drinking water for about 884 million people.

2. Inadequate access to water for sanitation and waste disposal for 2.5 billion people.

3. Groundwater over drafting (excessive use) leading to diminished agricultural yields.

4. Overuse and pollution of water resources harming biodiversity.

5. Regional conflicts over scarce water resources sometimes resulting in warfare.

Potential Hot Spots:

Egypt: A coalition led by Ethiopia is challenging old agreements that allow Egypt to use more than 50 percent of the Nile’s flow. Without the river, all of Egypt would be desert.

Eastern Europe: Decades of pollution have fouled the Danube, leaving down-stream countries, such as Hungary and the Republic of Moldova, scrambling to find new sources of water.

Middle East: The Jordan River, racked by drought and diverted by Israeli, Syrian and the Jordanian dams, has lost 95 percent of its former flow.

Former Soviet Union: The Aral sea, at one time the world’s fourth largest inland sea, has lost 75 percent of its water because of diversion programs begun in the 1960s.

There are many other countries of the world that are severely impacted with regard to human health and inadequate drinking water. The following is a partial list of some of the countries with significant populations (numerical population of affected population listed) whose only consumption is of contaminated water:

 Sudan: 12.3 million

 Venezuela: 5.0 million

 Ethiopia: 2.7 million

 Tunisia: 2.1 million

 Cuba :1.3 million

#### The Vogtle plant is fine – fears of it are fact-optional : quals, anti-nuclear bias

Skutnick and Rominger 2/21/12

<http://neutroneconomy.blogspot.com/2012/02/other-thing-vogtle-has-revived-nuclear.html>

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The other thing Vogtle has revived: Nuclear hysteria Kitchen sink They say no one likes a buzzkill, but almost as if on queue, the NRC's announcement of its issue of the first combined operating license (COL) in over three decades has drawn out the usual suspects committed to reassuring us that this both simultaneously meaningless (read, "The Nuclear Renaissance is still dead!") and yet somehow at the same time, an imminent danger. Call it the nuclear equivalent of the "double-tap" - anti-nuclear activists will throw out everything (kitchen sinks included) as an effort to kill off an apparently "moribund" comeback of nuclear energy. The Vogtle announcement seems to have put this process into overdrive. One probably needs to learn to develop thick skin when working in this field, but sometimes the arguments get obnoxious enough to be called out on their own. Take for example a recent facts-optional anti-nuclear jeremiad published over at The Energy Collective (Disclosure: On occasion my posts are syndicated over there), entitled, "Rethinking the Nuclear Renaissance." The piece is essentially a warmed-over serving of recycled arguments (one can suppose at least that part of it makes it "green"), made somehow new and interesting by the fact that there has been some incremental forward motion on reactor construction in the United States. (But never fear, readers - as our intrepid author assures us, "...only 5 reactors including the two in Georgia that are likely to be completed in the next decade," and yet another of those was one which started in the 70's [Watts Barr] and never completed.) At this point already one may wish to don their wading boots, because at the risk of falling into the classic XCKD trap, we're about to go debunking. Getting down into the thick of it, the author, Holbert Janson, implies that the process of licensing the two Georgia units was rushed, citing as his evidence the lone dissenting vote by Chairman Gregory Jaczko, who expressed concerns that the licensing process had not adequately addressed issues raised by the Fukushima disaster. Let's run with that point for a moment, shall we? Not only is the design being licensed - Westinghouse's AP1000 design - one which relies exclusively on natural circulation for cooling in an emergency scenario (i.e., no diesel-powered pumps are required to circulate coolant within the core, obviating the failure mode which actually occurred), but the Vogtle site is also nowhere near an active seismic boundary. Further, many of the concerns raised over Fukushima - such as allowing for better instrumentation and monitoring in spent fuel pools - are ones which do not impact the actual facility design itself. Perhaps most tellingly, the only Commissioner to vote against the license was the one with absolutely zero experience in nuclear engineering or reactors whatsosoever (Chairman Jaczko's background is a Ph.D. in theoretical particle physics, and his prior experience has been confined to serving as legislative staff to Rep. Ed Markey and Sen. Harry Reid); compare this to the near century of combined nuclear experience of the other four Commissioners. (Again, while an argument from authority is never an argument unto itself, the break in the vote along experience lines is telling - especially given that these four Commissioners represent both Republican and Democratic appointments.) With little logical connection to the prior point, Janson then segues into attempting to imply nefarious politics at work responsible for all of this: The erstwhile nuclear power renaissance was the result of decades of lobbying and spending by players in the nuclear industry after the Three Mile Island incident effectively halted any new nuclear power in the U.S. for over a generation. Frankly, if it's taken three decades of "lobbying and spending" to achieve a paltry five reactors (one of which isn't even new - an obviously important point according to our author), the nuclear industry has gotten the raw end of the deal on this one. What about the very lucrative (and from the results, if one measures by direct subsidies) lobbying by the "renewables" industry, to which if Spain is any example, would implode without generous government support? Janson is of course silent on this point. Janson then goes on to question the green bona fides of nuclear power, pointing out of course that yes, in fact, we have to mine uranium ore. In other news, we also have to smelt iron and aluminum to build wind turbines (and lots of it if you plan on generating any kind of serious power) - but I suppose we'll assume those are consequence-free operations. Inexplicably, this then appears in the midst of his deconstruction of nuclear's green credentials: Unlike other alternative energy sources nuclear power does not enjoy strong public support. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima all served, and rightfully so, to frighten the public over the potential catastrophic risks inherent in nuclear power. First, since when did "public support" have any bearing on scientific facts? Were that the case, evolution and climate change would certainly be in dangerous territory (and the theory of a geocentric universe might well be in for a revival). Second is his telling choice of phrase - "Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima all served, and rightfully so, to frighten the public." So, a nuclear accident in which not one person died (Three Mile Island) and another - the worst in a generation in which still no one has received a fatal dose of radiation (Fukushima) - should be serving to "scare the public?" Nevermind the tens of thousands who died from the great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami - people should be scared of something which has yet to kill anyone. (Meanwhile, the case of Chernobyl is one which is one which strictly speaking could not happen in the U.S., specifically because the nature of this reactor - the reaction "speeds up" as the temperature increases - is specifically prohibited by law in the U.S., for compelling safety reasons). Further, if mass casualties should serve to "frighten the public," one wonders then why Mr. Janson does not consider the case of the Bhopal disaster - an industrial accident at a Union Carbide chemical facility in India which killed over 3000 people within a few weeks and injured tens of thousands more. By this estimate, a single industrial accident - Bhopal - has killed more people itself than the combined fleet of over 400 reactors across the globe. So where is the campaign to cease large-scale chemical and industrial facilities? Chances are you won't find it - some risks, it would seem, are more tolerable than others.

Dialogic engagement over pragmatic policy proposals creates linkages and strategies capable of combatting environmental racism and injustice

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(Mei-Fang, “Democracy and Environmental Justice: The Case of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Taiwan,” Paper for the Political Studies Association 54th Annual Conference, Section 8-5: Democratisation and Sustainability 2, 6-8 April)

Habermas’s ideal of consensus is seen as outmoded (Lyotard, 1984: 66), unattainable and undesirable as people can have different reasons for agreement on a particular action (Dryzek, 2000: 170). Habermas recognizes this problem and his later work Between Facts and Norms attempts to **be more open to difference**, which includes ‘pragmatic discourse about what should be done in terms of translating consensus into binding decision capable of implementation, and negotiations concerning what to do when values and interests irreducibly conflict’ (Dryzek, 2000: 24-5). Intercultural dialogue does not need to seek unanimous agreement. As Antonio (1989: 743) puts it, ‘pragmatist social interaction depends on the capacity to share attitudes and does not rely on value consensus; sympathetic understanding of the other does not require agreement or homogeneity.’ Following the conception of pragmatism, intercultural dialogue over environmental justice allows arriving at agreement on goals or actions without necessarily reaching a shared set of reasons for these goals or actions or value positions. Hutchison (2003: 34-6) argues that borders based on territorial, cultural, ethnic or religious categories as a production of socialization restrict the participation of ‘outsiders’ in discourse on issues that are of concern to them. Group interaction or intercultural dialogue is **undermined by dominant modes of thought**, by history and by context. For dealing with difference of values, she argues, pragmatism provides an alternative framework that ‘prompts flexibility and acceptance when thinking of those “outside” our borders’ (p.36). According to Rorty (1999: 48), ‘all our knowledge is under descriptions suited to our current social purposes’, which best copes with our situation. A pragmatic approach to intercultural dialogue suggests we seek ‘to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can’ and strive for ‘as much intersubjective agreement as possible because we realize that ‘no interpretation of reality is innately superior (Rorty, 1991: 23; Hutchison, 2003: 36). Relying on research conducted by social psychologists which shows that that ‘the boundaries of the moral community within which people are willing to apply principles of justice to fellow members are affected by perceptions of similarity and common identity’, Miller (2002: 219) provides critique of radical differences between groups within the community because ‘people who identify exclusively with their ethnic sub-groups as opposed to embracing a more inclusive identity alongside it are less willing to accept the authority of procedures that may be used to resolve disputes or allocate resources, and become more concerned about well or how badly they have fared personally in the outcome.’ He suggests participants in the dialogue need to be more justice-driven: You must **strike a fine balance** between emphasizing what you have in common with other members of your audience, so as to win their sympathy and motivate them to see you as someone to whom justice is owned, and **emphasizing the ways in which you are different**, and which mean that you have special needs or suffer special disadvantages. (Miller, 2002: 221). I think Miller had it right that the dialectics between commonality and difference is important for the process of intercultural dialogue. Notions of environmental justice should be understood in a more pluralist and pragmatic fashion in a multicultural society that is more open to others with difference, and does not demand unanimous agreement in the dialogic process as a basis for collective decision. Intercultural dialogue helps people realize a variety of different ways of thinking about environmental justice, but the validity of ideas should be tested through their efficacy in practice (Rescher, 1993: 192-3). Siegfriend (1996: 275) makes a similar argument from a pragmatic feminist perspective that this method ‘does not mean avoiding conflicts or denying differences.’ A pragmatic approach to intercultural dialogue can **best cope with the complex situation**, and the norms or values arrived at through intercultural dialogic procedure would enhance interactions and the recognition of group differences. Fvanoff (2002: 57) argues that our socially constructed ideas and values can be challenged and reformulated in ways that are more adaptive to changing situations. Constructivism sees norms and principles as being actively ‘produced’ through the process of dialogue in which the participants are open to the differing perspective of others, acknowledge the limitations of their own particular perspectives, and change their initial positions as they learn from each other. Following Evanoff (2002), I argue that the differing idea of environmental justice held by the Yami, the Taiwanese and other Taiwanese aboriginal environmental communities are not inevitable or absolute. New values and norms can be created through the interactions and dialogue among a variety of environmental communities that enables us to best stand in nuclear waste dilemmas. According to MacIntyre (1988), no existing tradition implies a university conception of justice and the coming together of communities with various traditions might open up new alternative possibilities and enlarge our views of justice. He outlines three stages of the process of developing a wider perspective and new concepts: A first in which the relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities have not yet been put in question; a second in which inadequacies of various types have been identified, but not yet remedied; and a third in which response to those inadequacies has resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations (1998, 355). Dialogue between the Yami, the Taiwanese and other aboriginal environmental communities with various traditions can facilitate reflection on the various positions and the transformation of those beliefs or concepts unable to deal with the conflicts between them and nuclear waste dilemmas. The multiple understanding of environmental justice and **competing views** on nuclear waste management held by the Yami and Taiwanese groups **can be critically tested**, and a variety of environmental communities need to reflect on the questions of what should be done. Following Mendus’s (1989) discussions of Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, Philip (1993: 157, 161) argues for ‘more dynamic sense of differences as changing.’ She rightly suggests that difference ‘challenges dominant groups to reassess their own values and perspective, but also challenges subordinate and excluded groups to go beyond sectarian loyalties.’ **This does not mean that difference can be denied**, but seeks for ‘a wider sense of belonging.’ The idea held by the Yami and Taiwanese environmental communities might on the surface appear incommensurable, but different principles might be integrated into a larger framework that are widely accepted in a given social context and appropriate to address nuclear waste dilemmas. Intercultural dialogue among a variety of environmental communities helps enhance a sense of recognition, build bridges between the Yami, the Taiwanese and other Taiwanese aborigines, and remove the barriers to establishing alliance between them.

# 2NC

## at: we meet

Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### On is exclusively targeted

Dictionary.com No Date

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on?s=t

“ON”:16. (used to indicate a source or a person or thing that serves as a source or agent): a duty on imported goods; She depends on her friends for encouragement.

Including regulations is a limits disaster

Doub 76

Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy

Annual Review of Energy

Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976)

DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 1757 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036

http://0-www.annualreviews.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

Mr. Doub is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing, which he formed in 1977. Previously he was a partner in the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 - 1974. He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission in 1968 - 1971 and was appointed by the President of the United States to the President's Air Quality Advisory Board in 1970. He is a member of the American Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and Federal Bar Association. He is immediate past Chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum. He currently serves as a member of the nuclear export policy committees of both the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Energy Council. Mr. Doub graduated from Washington and Jefferson College (B.A., 1953) and the University of Maryland School of Law in 1956. He is married, has two children, and resides in Potomac, Md. He was born September 3, 1931, in Cumberland, Md.

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy selfsufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. More than 40 agencies were found to be involved with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could significantly affect the availability and/or cost of energy. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

Causes bidirectionality

McKie 84

Professor James W. McKie, distinguished member of the economics department at The University of Texas at Austin for many years

McKie, J W

Annual Review of Environment and Resource , Volume 9 (1)

Annual Reviews – Nov 1, 1984

THE MULTIPLE PURPOSES OF ENERGY REGULATION AND PROMOTION Federal energy policy since World War II has developed into a vast and multidirectional program of controls, incentives, restraints, and promotions. This development accelerated greatly during the critical decade after 1973, and has become a pervasive and sometimes controlling influence in the energy economy. Its purposes, responding to a multitude of interests and aims in the economy, have frequently been inconsistent, if not obscure, and the results have often been confusing or disappointing.

## at: duffy

Switch side debate

Duffy 83

Duffy ’83 [Bernard, Rhetoric PhD – Pitt, Communication Prof – Cal Poly, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal,” National Forensics Journal, Spring, pp 65-71, accessed at <http://www.nationalforensics.org/journal/vol1no1-6.pdf>]

I am not proposing that debaters only make arguments they believe in. Students also learn from articulating the principles which underlie positions they oppose.

Rules

Duffy 83

Duffy ’83 [Bernard, Rhetoric PhD – Pitt, Communication Prof – Cal Poly, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal,” National Forensics Journal, Spring, pp 65-71, accessed at <http://www.nationalforensics.org/journal/vol1no1-6.pdf>]

But in this case, why talk about the ethics of debate at all? If the term only means observing the rules of the game, it is not particularly significant. Debate should be a thoroughly ethical enterprise. It should educate students in ethics, as well as requiring them to follow the rules.

CUTTING EVIDENCE IN CONTEXT

Duffy 83

Duffy ’83 [Bernard, Rhetoric PhD – Pitt, Communication Prof – Cal Poly, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal,” National Forensics Journal, Spring, pp 65-71, accessed at <http://www.nationalforensics.org/journal/vol1no1-6.pdf>]

Instead there are countless arguments from authority. Authority is fine as a source of argument as long as it is not overused and the authorities are properly selected. The excessive reliance of debaters on arguments from authority, however, makes them subservient to the opinions of others. In the ideal, debaters evaluate evidence for its credibility and its correspondence with their own beliefs. In practice, they often fail to read the context of their evidence, do not know the credentials of the sources, nor even at times understand the evidence they read with such lightening speed. An over-dependence on authority depersonalizes the process of debate. It makes it far less humane or humanizing. Debaters, to use a phrase of Weaver's, become "logic machines," programmed to match evidence against their opponents' evidence.5 While the process of selection and organization this involves no doubt improves debaters' logical abilities and skills in gamesmanship, it does not necessarily make them aware of their own humanness, that is, of their individual character and ethics. Ethics, after all, grow out of feeling and choice and not simply the complex operations of mind we refer to as logic.

Duffy is wrong - Switch side debate is good

Koehle 10

Joe Koehle, Phd candidate in communications at Kansas, former West Georgia debater

http://mccfblog.org/actr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Koehle\_Paper\_ACTR-editedPDF.pdf.

Much like criticism of the sophists has persisted throughout time; criticism of switch side debate has been a constant feature since the advent of tournament-style debating. Harrigan documents how numerous these criticisms have been in the last century, explaining that Page 15 Koehle 15 complaints about the mode of debate are as old as the activity itself (9). The most famous controversy over modern switch side debate occurred in 1954, when the U.S. military academies and the Nebraska teachers‟ colleges decided to boycott the resolution: “Resolved: That the United States should extend diplomatic relations to the communist government of China.” The schools that boycotted the topic argued that it was ethically and educationally indefensible to defend a recognition of communists, and even went so far as to argue that “a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country‟s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends and to distortion by our enemies” (English et al. 221). Switch side debate was on the defensive, and debate coaches of the time were engaged in virulent debate over the how to debate. The controversy made the national news when the journalist Edward Murrow became involved and opined on the issue in front of millions of TV viewers. English et al. even go so far as to credit the “debate about debate” with helping accelerate the implosion of the famous red- baiting Senator Joseph McCarthy (222). The debate about debate fell back out of the national spotlight after the high-profile incident over the China resolution, but it never ended in the debate community itself. The tenor of the debate reached a fever pitch when outright accusations of modern sophistry (the bad kind) were published in the Spring 1983 edition of the National Forensic Journal, when Bernard K. Duffy wrote, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal.” Echoing the old Platonic argument against sophistic practice, Duffy argued that switch side debate has ignored ethical considerations in the pursuit of teaching cheap techniques for victory (66). The 1990‟s saw a divergence of criticisms into two different camps. The first camp was comprised of traditional critics who argued that debate instruction and practice promoted form over substance. For example, a coach from Boston College lamented that absent a change, “Debate instructors and their students will become the sophists of our age, susceptible to the traditional indictments elucidated by Isocrates and others” (Herbeck). Dale Bertelstein published a response to the previously cited article by Muir about switch side debate that launched into an extended discussion of debate and sophistry. This article continued the practice of coaches and communications scholars developing and applying the Platonic critique of the sophists to contemporary debate practices. Alongside this traditional criticism a newer set of critiques of switch side debate emerged. Armed with the language of Foucauldian criticism, Critical Legal Studies, and critiques of normativity and statism, many people who were uncomfortable with the debate tradition of arguing in favor of government action began to question the reason why one should ever be obliged to advocate government action. They began to argue that switch side debate was a mode of debate that unnecessarily constrained people to the hegemony of debating the given topic. These newer criticisms of switch side debate gained even more traction after the year 2000, with several skilled teams using these arguments to avoid having to debate one side of the topic. William Spanos, a professor of English at SUNY Binghamton decided to link the ethos of switch side debate to that of neo-conservatism after observing a debate tournament, saying that “the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush…learned their „disinterested‟ argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed.” (Spanos 467) Contemporary policy debate is now under attack from all sides, caught in its own dissoi logoi. Given the variety of assaults upon switch side debate by both sides of the political spectrum, how can switch side debate be justified? Supporters of switch side debate have made many arguments justifying the value of the practice that are not related to any defense of sophist Page 17 Koehle 17 techniques. I will only briefly describe them so as to not muddle the issue, but they are worthy of at least a cursory mention. The first defense is the most pragmatic reason of all: Mandating people debate both sides of a topic is most fair to participants because it helps mitigate the potential for a topic that is biased towards one side. More theoretical justifications are given, however. Supporters of switch side debate have argued that encouraging students to play the devil‟s advocate creates a sense of self-reflexivity that is crucial to promoting tolerance and preventing dogmatism (Muir 287). Others have attempted to justify switch side debate in educational terms and advocacy terms, explaining that it is a path to diversifying a student‟s knowledge by encouraging them to seek out paths they may have avoided otherwise, which in turn creates better public advocates (Dybvig and Iversen). In fact, contemporary policy debate and its reliance upon switching sides creates an oasis of argumentation free from the demands of advocacy, allowing students to test out ideas and become more well-rounded advocates as they leave the classroom and enter the polis (Coverstone). Finally, debate empowers individuals to become critical thinkers capable of making sound decisions (Mitchell, “Pedagogical Possibilities”, 41).

## 2nc at: switch side bad

Only switching sides produces an energy dialogue that activates critique

Stevenson, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, ‘9

(Ruth, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, p. 512-526)

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, **encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus.** Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69).

Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

## 2nc at: roleplay bad

Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below

## 2nc at: case specific exclusion/ethics

Topical version of the aff solves: incentivize nuclear power with equitable siting or switch to community renewables

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in **decision making** diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of **grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states.** In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the **legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions** which produced those projects.

Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.

In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The **technicality** **of the issue** **was not a barrier** to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the **goals of energy policy could be recast** and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.

First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest **undermined** the **legitimacy** of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

## at: personal/consistent advocacy good

Our model of education doesn’t trade off with personal convictions, but it does make debaters stronger advocates

Hodson, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, ‘9

(Derek, “Towards an Action-oriented Science Curriculum,” Journal for Activist Science & Technology Education, Vol. 1, No. 1)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

Politicization of science education can be achieved by giving students the opportunity to confront **real world issues that have a scientific, technological or environmental dimension.** By grounding content in socially and personally relevant contexts, an issues-based approach can provide the motivation that is absent from current abstract, de-contextualized approaches and can form a base from which students can construct understanding that is personally relevant, meaningful and important. It can provide increased opportunities for active learning, inquiry-based learning, collaborative learning and direct experience of the situatedness and multidimensionality of scientific and technological practice. In the Western contemporary world,

technology is all pervasive; its social and environmental impact is clear; its disconcerting social implications and disturbing moral-ethical dilemmas are made apparent almost every day in popular newspapers, TV news bulletins and Internet postings. In many ways, it is much easier to recognize how technology is determined by the sociocultural context in which it is located than to see how science is driven by such factors. It is much easier to see the environmental impact of technology than to see the ways in which science impacts on society and environment. For these kinds of reasons, it makes good sense to use problems and issues in technology and engineering as the major vehicles for contextualizing the science curriculum. This is categorically not an argument against teaching science; rather, it is an argument for teaching the science that informs an understanding of everyday technological problems and may assist students in **reaching tentative** **solutions** about where they stand on key SSI.

Doesn’t trade off with personal values—debate makes students more able to advocate for them

Jiménez-Aleixandre, professor of education – University of Santiago de Compostela, and Pereiro-Muñoz High School Castelao, Vigo (Spain), ‘2

(Maria-Pilar and Cristina, “Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management,” International Journal of Science Education Vol. 24, No. 11, p. 1171–1190)

Attitudes and values have a paramount role in environmental education. The importance accorded to values may be the reason why sometimes value development is discussed as if it could happen ‘disembodied’ from school knowledge. On the contrary, the perspective of this paper is that working with the goal of developing values in schools cannot rely on activities or tasks centred solely on attitudinal dimensions. Students can learn what attitudes to exhibit in order to fit the expectations of the teacher; and no doubt some activities and experiences may develop in them new attitudes and wishful thinking. But if the objective of environmental education is the development of a solid attitude, with a sound basis transferable to out-of-school contexts, then the values development needs to be related to understanding the complex conceptual issues involved in environmental problems.

In this paper, this issue is explored by trying to identify the particular concepts used by students and the **relationship between the concepts and the decisions taken.** Our interpretation is that the students constituted a knowledge-production community, combining ecological concepts such as impact, wetland or water flow, with **technical information** about the project they were evaluating. To reach a conclusion, they had to apply conceptual knowledge at more than a surface level, such as the effect of the drainpipe on the animals and plants through the lack of water or the destruction of their habitat. **The comparison of** the **warrants** used by them and by an external, ‘official’ expert shows a great amount of concordance in the content, supporting the claim that they were not just passive ‘knowledge consumers’.

## 2nc at: state/roleplaying bad

Decisionmaking skills learned from debate over technical energy issues are key to actualizing political change

Hodson, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, ‘10

(Derek, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest.

FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION

Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government

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and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy.**

## at: social death

#### social death is not ontologically inevitable - their pessimism and totalization of politics as slavery makes agency impossible and oversimplifies the history of resistance

Vincent **Brown**, Prof. of History and African and African-American Studies @ Harvard Univ., December 20**09**, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," American Historical Review, p. 1231-1249

Specters of the Atlantic is a compellingly sophisticated study of the relation be- tween the epistemologies underwriting both modern slavery and modern capitalism, but the book’s discussion of the politics of anti-slavery is fundamentally incomplete. While Baucom brilliantly traces the development of “melancholy realism” as an op- positional discourse that ran counter to the logic of slavery and finance capital, he has very little to say about the enslaved themselves. Social death, so well suited to the tragic perspective, stands in for the experience of enslavement. While this heightens the reader’s sense of the way Atlantic slavery haunts the present, Baucom largely fails to acknowledge that the enslaved performed melancholy acts of accounting not unlike those that he shows to be a fundamental component of abolitionist and human rights discourses, or that those acts could be a basic element of slaves’ oppositional activities. In many ways, the effectiveness of his text depends upon the silence of slaves—it is easier to describe the continuity of structures of power when one down- plays countervailing forces such as the political activity of the weak. So Baucom’s deep insights into the structural features of Atlantic slave trading and its afterlife come with a cost. Without engagement with the politics of the enslaved, slavery’s history serves as an effective charge leveled against modernity and capitalism, but not as an uneven and evolving process of human interaction, and certainly not as a locus of conflict in which the enslaved sometimes won small but important victories.11

Specters of the Atlantic is self-consciously a work of theory (despite Baucom’s prodigious archival research), and social death may be largely unproblematic as a matter of theory, or even law. In these arenas, as David Brion Davis has argued, “the slave has no legitimate, independent being, no place in the cosmos except as an instrument of her or his master’s will.”12 But the concept often becomes a general description of actual social life in slavery. Vincent Carretta, for example, in his au- thoritative biography of the abolitionist writer and former slave Olaudah Equiano, agrees with Patterson that because enslaved Africans and their descendants were “stripped of their personal identities and history, [they] were forced to suffer what has been aptly called ‘social death.’ ” The self-fashioning enabled by writing and print “allowed Equiano to resurrect himself publicly” from the condition that had been imposed by his enslavement.13 The living conditions of slavery in eighteenth-century Jamaica, one slave society with which Equiano had experience, are described in rich detail in Trevor Burnard’s unflinching examination of the career of Thomas Thistle- wood, an English migrant who became an overseer and landholder in Jamaica, and who kept a diary there from 1750 to 1786. Through Thistlewood’s descriptions of his life among slaves, Burnard glimpses a “world of uncertainty,” where the enslaved were always vulnerable to repeated depredations that actually led to “significant slave dehumanization as masters sought, with considerable success, to obliterate slaves’ personal histories.” Burnard consequently concurs with Patterson: “slavery completely stripped slaves of their cultural heritage, brutalized them, and rendered ordinary life and normal relationships extremely difficult.”14 This was slavery, after all, and much more than a transfer of migrants from Africa to America.15 Yet one wonders, after reading Burnard’s indispensable account, how slaves in Jamaica or- ganized some of British America’s greatest political events during Thistlewood’s time and after, including the Coromantee Wars of the 1760s, the 1776 Hanover conspiracy, and the Baptist War of 1831–1832. Surely they must have found some way to turn the “disorganization, instability, and chaos” of slavery into collective forms of belonging and striving, making connections when confronted with alien- ation and finding dignity in the face of dishonor. Rather than pathologizing slaves by allowing the condition of social death to stand for the experience of life in slavery, then, it might be more helpful to focus on what the enslaved actually made of their

situation.

Among the most insightful texts to explore the experiential meaning of Afro- Atlantic slavery (for both the slaves and their descendants) are two recent books by Saidiya Hartman and Stephanie Smallwood. Rather than eschewing the concept of social death, as might be expected from writing that begins by considering the per- spective of the enslaved, these two authors use the idea in penetrating ways. Hart- man’s Lose Your Mother: A Journey along the Atlantic Slave Route and Smallwood’s Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora extend social death beyond a general description of slavery as a condition and imagine it as an experience of self. Here both the promise and the problem with the concept are most fully apparent.16

Both authors seek a deeper understanding of the experience of enslavement and its consequences for the past, present, and future of black life than we generally find in histories of slavery. In Hartman’s account especially, slavery is not only an object of study, but also the focus of a personal memoir. She travels along a slave route in Ghana, from its coastal forts to the backcountry hinterlands, symbolically reversing the first stage of the trek now commonly called the Middle Passage. In searching prose, she meditates on the history of slavery in Africa to explore the precarious nature of belonging to the social category “African American.” Rendering her re- markable facility with social theory in elegant and affective terms, Hartman asks the question that nags all identities, but especially those forged by the descendants of slaves: What identifications, imagined affinities, mythical narratives, and acts of re- membering and forgetting hold the category together? Confronting her own alienation from any story that would yield a knowable genealogy or a comfortable identity, Hartman wrestles with what it means to be a stranger in one’s putative motherland, to be denied country, kin, and identity, and to forget one’s past—to be an orphan.17 Ultimately, as the title suggests, Lose Your Mother is an injunction to accept dis- possession as the basis of black self-definition.

Such a judgment is warranted, in Hartman’s account, by the implications of social death both for the experience of enslavement and for slavery’s afterlife in the present. As Patterson delineated in sociological terms the death of social personhood and the reincorporation of individuals into slavery, Hartman sets out on a personal quest to “retrace the process by which lives were destroyed and slaves born.”18 When she contends with what it meant to be a slave, she frequently invokes Patterson’s idiom: “Seized from home, sold in the market, and severed from kin, the slave was for all intents and purposes dead, no less so than had he been killed in combat. No less so than had she never belonged to the world.” By making men, women, and children into commodities, enslavement destroyed lineages, tethering people to own- ers rather than families, and in this way it “annulled lives, transforming men and women into dead matter, and then resuscitated them for servitude.” Admittedly, the enslaved “lived and breathed, but they were dead in the social world of men.”19 As it turns out, this kind of alienation is also part of what it presently means to be African American. “The transience of the slave’s existence,” for example, still leaves its traces in how black people imagine and speak of home:

We never tire of dreaming of a place that we can call home, a place better than here, wherever here might be . . . We stay there, but we don’t live there . . . Staying is living in a country without exercising any claims on its resources. It is the perilous condition of existing in a world in which you have no investments. It is having never resided in a place that you can say is yours. It is being “of the house” but not having a stake in it. Staying implies transient quarters, a makeshift domicile, a temporary shelter, but no attachment or affiliation. This sense of not belonging and of being an extraneous element is at the heart of slavery.20

“We may have forgotten our country,” Hartman writes, “but we haven’t forgotten our dispossession.”21

Like Baucom, Hartman sees the history of slavery as a constituent part of a tragic present. Atlantic slavery continues to be manifested in black people’s skewed life chances, poor education and health, and high rates of incarceration, poverty, and premature death. Disregarding the commonplace temporalities of professional historians, whose literary conventions are generally predicated on a formal distinction between past, present, and future, Hartman addresses slavery as a problem that spans all three. The afterlife of slavery inhabits the nature of belonging, which in turn guides the “freedom dreams” that shape prospects for change. “If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America,” she writes, “it is not because of an antiquated obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago.”22

A professor of English and comparative literature, Hartman is in many respects in a better position than most historians to understand events such as the funeral aboard the Hudibras. This is because for all of her evident erudition, her scholarship is harnessed not so much to a performance of mastery over the facts of what hap- pened, which might substitute precision for understanding, as to an act of mourning, even yearning. She writes with a depth of introspection and personal anguish that is transgressive of professional boundaries but absolutely appropriate to the task. Reading Hartman, one wonders how a historian could ever write dispassionately about slavery without feeling complicit and ashamed. For dispassionate accounting—exemplified by the ledgers of slave traders—has been a great weapon of the powerful, an episteme that made the grossest violations of personhood acceptable, even necessary. This is the kind of bookkeeping that bore fruit upon the Zong. “It made it easier for a trader to countenance yet another dead black body or for a captain to dump a shipload of captives into the sea in order to collect the insurance, since it wasn’t possible to kill cargo or to murder a thing already denied life. Death was simply part of the workings of the trade.” The archive of slavery, then, is “a mortuary.” Not content to total up the body count, Hartman offers elegy, echoing in her own way the lamentations of the women aboard the Hudibras. Like them, she is concerned with the dead and what they mean to the living. “I was desperate to reclaim the dead,” she writes, “to reckon with the lives undone and obliterated in the making of human commodities.”23

It is this mournful quality of Lose Your Mother that elevates it above so many histories of slavery, but the same sense of lament seems to require that Hartman overlook small but significant political victories like the one described by Butter- worth. Even as Hartman seems to agree with Paul Gilroy on the “value of seeing the consciousness of the slave as involving an extended act of mourning,” she remains so focused on her own commemorations that her text makes little space for a consideration of how the enslaved struggled with alienation and the fragility of belonging, or of the mourning rites they used to confront their condition.24 All of the ques- tions she raises about the meaning of slavery in the present—both highly personal and insistently political—might as well be asked about the meaning of slavery to slaves themselves, that is, if one begins by closely examining their social and political lives rather than assuming their lack of social being. Here Hartman is undone by her reliance on Orlando Patterson’s totalizing definition of slavery. She asserts that “no solace can be found in the death of the slave, no higher ground can be located, no perspective can be found from which death serves a greater good or becomes any- thing other than what it is.”25 If she is correct, the events on the Hudibras were of negligible importance. And indeed, Hartman’s understandable emphasis on the personal damage wrought by slavery encourages her to disavow two generations of social history that have demonstrated slaves’ remarkable capacity to forge fragile com- munities, preserve cultural inheritance, and resist the predations of slaveholders. This in turn precludes her from describing the ways that violence, dislocation, and death actually generate culture, politics, and consequential action by the enslaved.26

This limitation is particularly evident in a stunning chapter that Hartman calls “The Dead Book.” Here she creatively reimagines the events that occurred on the voyage of the slave ship Recovery, bound, like the Hudibras, from the Bight of Biafra to Grenada, when Captain John Kimber hung an enslaved girl naked from the mizzen stay and beat her, ultimately to her death, for being “sulky”: she was sick and could not dance when so ordered. As Hartman notes, the event would have been unre- markable had not Captain Kimber been tried for murder on the testimony of the ship’s surgeon, a brief transcript of the trial been published, and the woman’s death been offered up as allegory by the abolitionist William Wilberforce and the graphic satirist Isaac Cruikshank. Hartman re-creates the murder and the surge of words it inspired, representing the perspectives of the captain, the surgeon, and the aboli tionist, for each of whom the girl was a cipher “outfitted in a different guise,” and then she puts herself in the position of the victim, substituting her own voice for the unknowable thoughts of the girl. Imagining the experience as her own and wistfully representing her demise as a suicide—a final act of agency—Hartman hopes, by this bold device, to save the girl from oblivion. Or perhaps her hope is to prove the impossibility of ever doing so, because by failing, she concedes that the girl cannot be put to rest. It is a compelling move, but there is something missing. Hartman discerns a convincing subject position for all of the participants in the events sur- rounding the death of the girl, except for the other slaves who watched the woman die and carried the memory with them to the Americas, presumably to tell others, plausibly even survivors of the Hudibras, who must have drawn from such stories a basic perspective on the history of the Atlantic world. For the enslaved spectators, Hartman imagines only a fatalistic detachment: “The women were assembled a few feet away, but it might well have been a thousand. They held back from the girl, steering clear of her bad luck, pestilence, and recklessness. Some said she had lost her mind. What could they do, anyway? The women danced and sang as she lay dying.”

Hartman ends her odyssey among the Gwolu, descendants of peoples who fled the slave raids and who, as communities of refugees, shared her sense of dispos- session. “Newcomers were welcome. It didn’t matter that they weren’t kin because genealogy didn’t matter”; rather, “building community did.” Lose Your Mother con- cludes with a moving description of a particular one of their songs, a lament for those who were lost, which resonated deeply with her sense of slavery’s meaning in the present. And yet Hartman has more difficulty hearing similar cries intoned in the past by slaves who managed to find themselves.27

Saltwater Slavery has much in common with Lose Your Mother. Smallwood’s study of the slave trade from the Gold Coast to the British Americas in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries likewise redeems the experience of the people traded like so many bolts of cloth, “who were represented merely as ciphers in the political arithmetic,” and therefore “feature in the documentary record not as subjects of a social history but as objects or quantities.”28 Each text offers a penetrating analysis of the market logic that turned people into goods. Both books work with the concept of social death. However, Smallwood examines the problem of social death for the enslaved even more closely than Hartman does.29

Like Hartman, Smallwood sees social death as a by-product of commodification. “If in the regime of the market Africans’ most socially relevant feature was their exchangeability,” she argues, “for Africans as immigrants the most socially relevant feature was their isolation, their desperate need to restore some measure of social life to counterbalance the alienation engendered by their social death.” But Small- wood’s approach is different in a subtle way. Whereas for Hartman, as for others, social death is an accomplished state of being, Smallwood veers between a notion of social death as an actual condition produced by violent dislocation and social death as a compelling threat. On the one hand, she argues, captivity on the Atlantic littoral was a social death. Exchangeable persons “inhabited a new category of mar- ginalization, one not of extreme alienation within the community, but rather of ab- solute exclusion from any community.” She seems to accept the idea of enslaved commodities as finished products for whom there could be no socially relevant relationships: “the slave cargo constituted the antithesis of community.” Yet elsewhere she contends that captives were only “menaced” with social death. “At every point along the passage from African to New World markets,” she writes, “we find a stark contest between slave traders and slaves, between the traders’ will to commodify people and the captives’ will to remain fully recognizable as human subjects.”30 Here, I think, Smallwood captures the truth of the idea: social death was a receding ho- rizon—the farther slaveholders moved toward the goal of complete mastery, the more they found that struggles with their human property would continue, even into the most elemental realms: birth, hunger, health, fellowship, sex, death, and time.

If social death did not define the slaves’ condition, it did frame their vision of apocalypse. In a harrowing chapter on the meaning of death (that is, physical death) during the Atlantic passage, Smallwood is clear that the captives could have no frame of reference for the experience aboard the slave ships, but she also shows how des- perate they were to make one. If they could not reassemble some meaningful way to map their social worlds, “slaves could foresee only further descent into an endless purgatory.” The women aboard the Hudibras were not in fact the living dead; they were the mothers of gasping new societies. Their view of the danger that confronted them made their mourning rites vitally important, putting these at the center of the women’s emerging lives as slaves—and as a result at the heart of the struggles that would define them. As Smallwood argues, this was first and foremost a battle over their presence in time, to define their place among ancestors, kin, friends, and future progeny. “The connection Africans needed was a narrative continuity between past and present—an epistemological means of connecting the dots between there and here, then and now, to craft a coherent story out of incoherent experience.” That is precisely what the women on the Hudibras fought to accomplish.31

## at: roleplay = passivity

DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

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professor.

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

## at: fairness/predictability = elitist

Predictability maintains meaningful politics and empathy even if their DA is correct

Massaro, Prof Law – Florida, ’89

(Toni M, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.

My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.

Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55

As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.

Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.

A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

# 1NR

## secrecy

#### Secrecy footnote article

The nuclear power industry will soon launch a major propaganda campaign in Black America, hyping atomic energy as a jobs program. I’ve seen it all before, up close, more than 30 years ago, when the Westinghouse Corporation became a regular advertiser on the syndicated television news interview program I co-owned and hosted, America’s Black Forum. That was back in 1978, a year before the near-meltdown at Three Mile Island. The Pittsburgh-based nuclear power corporation had just completed a study that showed African Americans were more interested in jobs, and less concerned about environmental issues, than whites. Westinghouse’s executives figured that jobs-hungry Black folks would serve as a counter-point to the long-haired white kids and tree-huggers that the media caricatured as the core of the environmental movement. We should note that the data in Westinghouse’s survey did not say that Blacks were friendlier to nuclear power than whites – only that they cared more about jobs, as a logical consequence of having fewer of them. The idea was to convince Blacks that nukes = jobs, and that words like “environment” and “ecology” had nothing to do with them. So, with great hopes of political success, Westinghouse bought advertising - lots of it – on my show and other Black-oriented media around the country.

1978 was also the year that the modern environmental justice movement began, under the godfathership of Dr. Robert Bullard, a Black environmental sociologist who was documenting how America dumps its industrial and other unwanted wastes disproportionately in Black neighborhoods. Dr. Bullard’s data provided the objective evidence that proved the crucial link between environmental issues and social justice.

“Westinghouse’s executives figured that jobs-hungry Black folks would serve as a counter-point to the long-haired white kids and tree-huggers that the media caricatured as the core of the environmental movement.”

As far as Dr. Bullard is concerned, the racial politics of nuclear power is no different than the politics of other industrial hazards; it’s easier to dump them in Black neighborhoods. And now, as

thirty years ago, Black unemployment remains roughly twice the rate of whites, leading nuclear power corporations to believe that Blacks will be far more enthusiastic than whites about any industrial scheme that holds out the hope of jobs.

With President Obama's blessing and more than $8 billion dollars in guaranteed public money, the nuclear power folks plan to build two new plants in majority Black and desperately poor Burke County, Georgia, where cancer rates are far higher than surrounding regions and jobs are still scarce for Blacks even though nuclear plants have been located there since the 1950s. In an article in the Huffington Post, Dr. Robert Bullard told Black Agenda Report's Bruce Dixon that Black communities on the fencelines of nuclear plants “don't get the jobs. They get pollution and more poverty. And they get sick.”

But corporate promoters are already re-revving their propaganda machines to sell Blacks on nuclear power with the same jobs-creation argument they pushed three decades ago. Nuclear companies have been flying Black and brown delegations to visit happy neighborhoods around power plants in France. The Black press is onboard, too, because that's where the advertising dollars are, and because the Black president says that nukes mean jobs. For Black Agenda Radio, I'm Glen Ford. On the web, go to [www.BlackAgendaReport.com](http://www.BlackAgendaReport.com).

## engagement good

#### Here’s more evidence – engagement is better than passivity

**Hodson**, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, **‘10**

(Derek, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

## water

#### No impact on water

Jack **Spencer and** Aurelian **Braun 12**, Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy at Heritage, Aurelian is a member of the Young Leaders Program at Heritage, “Powering America Vignette: What is a Cooling Tower?”, June 22, <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/06/22/powering-america-vignette-what-is-a-cooling-tower/>

There has been some controversy in the past regarding just how much water nuclear power plants actually use. For example, the Susquehanna plant in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, uses about 31 million gallons of water per day. To put that into perspective, 27.4 billion gallons of water per day flow from the Susquehanna River into the Chesapeake Bay. This means that the plant uses a whopping 0.07 percent of the water that flows through the river each day. A typical nuclear plant supplies over 700,000 homes with energy. The plant consumes between 13 and 23 gallons of water per household; the average household uses around 94 gallons of water each day.

## vogtle – impact d

#### A meltdown’s impossible

Biello 3/23/11

David Biello has been covering energy and the environment for nearly a decade, the last four years as an associate editor at Scientific American. He also hosts 60-Second Earth, a Scientific American podcast covering environmental news, and is working on a documentary with Detroit Public Television on the future of electricity.

<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=new-nuclear-designs-balance-safety-and-cost>

For example, the AP1000s being built in Georgia boast "passive" safety features—safety technology that kicks in with or without human intervention or electricity. In the case of the Westinghouse AP1000 design that means cooling water sits above the reactor core and, in the event of a potential meltdown like at Fukushima Daiichi or Three Mile Island in Pa., will, with the opening of a heat-sensitive valve, simply flow water into the reactor, dousing the meltdown. "Never has so much money been spent to prove that water runs downhill," Westinghouse spokesman Vaughn Gilbert told Scientific American in 2009.

Further, although the thick steel vessel containing the nuclear reactor is encased in a further shell of 1.2-meter-thick concrete, that shell is surrounded by a building that is open to the sky. Should the concrete containment vessel begin to heat up during a meltdown, natural convection would pull in cooling air.

#### Their authors are just as ideological as ours – accidents are self-contained

Rod **Adams 12**, Former submarine Engineer Officer, Founder, Adams Atomic Engines, Inc., “Has Apocalyptic Portrayal of Climate Change Risk Backfired?”, May 2, <http://atomicinsights.com/2012/05/has-apocalyptic-portrayal-of-climate-change-risk-backfired.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AtomicInsights+%28Atomic+Insights%29>

Not only was the discussion enlightening about the reasons why different people end up with different opinions about climate change responses when presented with essentially the same body of information, but it also got me thinking about a possible way to fight back against the Gundersens, Caldicotts, Riccios, Grossmans and Wassermans of the world. That group of five tend to use apocalyptic rhetoric to describe what will happen to the world if we do not immediately start turning our collective backs on all of the benefits that abundant atomic energy can provide. They spin tall tales of deformed children, massive numbers of cancers as a result of minor radioactive material releases, swaths of land made “uninhabitable” for thousands of years, countries “cut in half”, and clouds of “hot particles” raining death and destruction ten thousand miles from the release point. Every one of those clowns have been repeating similar stories for at least two solid decades, and continue to repeat their stories even after supposedly catastrophic failures at Fukushima have not resulted in a single radiation related injury or death. According to eminent scientists – like Dr. Robert Gale – Fukushima is unlikely to EVER result in any measurable increase in radiation related illness. One important element that we have to consider to assess cancer risks associated with an accident like Fukushima is our baseline risk for developing cancer. All of us, unfortunately, have a substantial risk of developing cancer in our lifetime. For example, a 50-year-old male has a 42% risk of developing cancer during his remaining life; it’s almost the same for a 10-year-old. This risk only decreases when we get much older and only because we are dying of other causes. It’s true that excess radiation exposure can increase our cancer risk above baseline levels; it’s clear from studies of the survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of people exposed to radiation in medical and occupational settings, and of people exposed to radon decay products in mines and home basements. When it comes to exposures like that of Fukushima, the question is: What is the relative magnitude of the increased risk from Fukushima compared to our baseline cancer risk? Despite our fears, it is quite small. If the nuclear industry – as small and unfocused as it is – really wanted to take action to isolate the apocalyptic antinuclear activists, it could take a page from the effective campaign of the fossil fuel lobby. It could start an integrated campaign to help the rest of us to remember that, despite the dire predictions, the sky never fell, the predicted unnatural deaths never occurred, the deformations were figments of imagination, and the land is not really irreversibly uninhabitable for generations. The industry would effectively share the story of Ukraine’s recent decision to begin repopulating the vast majority of the “dead zone” that was forcibly evacuated after the Chernobyl accident. It would put some context into the discussion about radiation health effects; even if leaders shy away from directly challenging the Linear No Threshold (LNT) dose assumption, they can still show that even that pessimistic model says that a tiny dose leads to a tiny risk. Aside: My personal opinion is that the LNT is scientifically unsupportable and should be replaced with a much better model. We deserve far less onerous regulations; there is evidence that existing regulations actually cause harm. I hear a rumor that there is a group of mostly retired, but solidly credentialed professionals who are organizing a special session at the annual ANS meeting to talk about effective ways to influence policy changes. End Aside. Most of us recognize that there is no such thing as a zero risk; repeated assertions of “there is no safe level” should be addressed by accepting “close enough” to zero so that even the most fearful person can stop worrying. The sky has not fallen, even though we have experienced complete core meltdowns and secondary explosions that did some visible damage. Nuclear plants are not perfect, there will be accidents and there will be radioactive material releases. History is telling me that the risks are acceptable, especially in the context of the real world where there is always some potential for harm. The benefits of accepting a little nuclear risk are immense and must not be marginalized by the people who market fear and trembling.

## at: detroit / fermi

#### Lagoona was totally fine, this is alarmism

Robinson 4

<http://www.commentary.net/view/atearchive/s76a3898.htm>

My name is Art Robinson. I am Professor of Chemistry at the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, and I publish a pro-science, pro-technology, pro-free enterprise monthly newsletter, Access to Energy, which in September 1997 began its twenty fifth year. Access to Energy was founded by Professor Petr Beckmann in 1973 and published by him until his death in 1993.

We Almost Lost Detroit by J.G Fuller (Reader's Digest Press, $8.95) is a landmark in the history of yellow journalism. The title refers to an incident at the experimental Fermi I breeder reactor in 1966, and though this is not the only subject of the book, it should do as a sample of Fuller's reporting, for the facts are very simple: On October 5, 1966, a metal plate broke loose in the reactor, partially blocking the flow of coolant to two (yes, two!) out of the 100 fuel rods; the two rods overheated and some of their fuel melted. The reactor was promptly shut down

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and all safety systems worked as planned. No significant radiation escaped the steel vessel, let alone the containment building, let alone making the 30 miles to Detroit, let alone harming a Detroit fly. The reactor was later rebuilt and resumed operation. That is how we almost lost Detroit. (As in all "incidents," a wealth of public documents is available. For details, write AIF, 7101 Wisconsin Ave. Wash., DC 20014. See also "Why we didn't almost lose Detroit," Detroit Engineer, Dec. 1975). There is nothing in the book that would make the reader suspect what the simple truth about Fermi I was. Far from explaining that the very first line of defense worked in Fermi's system of defense in depth, or that a disaster was improbable even if all of the core had melted, Fuller tries to make out that a nuclear plant requires infallible people and perfect technology. But his main weapon is "the truth, but not the whole truth, "and to paraphrase his method, one might state that "ever since he wrote his book, Mr. Fuller has not raped a single woman, at least not in broad daylight. The predictable results were not long in coming. The New York Times Book Review (11/30/75) published a review which, among other hair-raising statements, refers to an imminent threat of nuclear explosion. That, is of course, is no longer innuendo; it is a pure and simple lie. When next you read the New York Times, remember it is the paper that said a nuclear explosion in a nuclear plant was possible; literally, "the technician's gingerly tinkered with the renegade's invisible interior. They knew what the public did not - a mistake could trigger a nuclear explosion."

## at: this stuff doesn’t matter

#### Evaluation of concrete implications is the make it or break it for environmental justice

Foreman 98

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Ph.D. (1980), A.M. (1977), A.B. (1974), Harvard University

The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

More frequent resort to a rationalizing, if not solely economic, perspective would encourage minority and low-income citizens and community leaders to think more carefully about priority-setting and myriad tradeoffs. Might widespread successes of NIMBY (not in my back yard) initiatives keep older and dirtier pollution sources active longer and thus adversely affect minority and low-income persons living adjacent to those sources? By the same token, does local insistence on full treatment at some Superfund sites (that is, the obsession with Breyer's "last ten percent") mean that risks elsewhere that might have been addressed under a more limited or flexible regime will not get attended to at all? Such questions cannot be answered here, but the disinclination even to pose them is troubling. That a "nobody should suffer" position advocating maximum citizen engagement could have perverse effects will be painful for many even to consider. But honestly confronting the reality that no environmental amenity (with the possible exception of planetary gravity) is equally distributed may help make citizens more likely to ask hard questions about which inequities matter most. A more careful and comprehensive set of environmental equity comparisons than has been produced to date would probably conclude that there is reason for cheer on some fronts. After all, many Native Americans residing on tribal land, along with rural blacks, doubtless breathe far cleaner air than many far wealthier city dwellers. Of course, once broader social equity concerns—the real motivation for much environmental justice advocacy—are factored in, any clean air advantage may appear insignificant. If Albert Nichols is right that failure to set environmental priorities based on risk has only worsened the inequities faced by minority and low-income communities, then there is even more compelling reason for greater reliance on a rationalizing approach. Writes Nichols in a direct critique of Bullard: If we accept the argument that the existing (politicized] approach has paid insufficient attention to the health and environmental risks faced by minority communities, what does that then say about a risk-based alternative? A strategy that emphasized attacking the largest and most easily reduced risks first would appear to represent a major gain for minority communities. To the extent that such communities bear unusually high risks as a result of past discrimination or other factors, a risk-based approach would redirect more resources to these communities. Indeed, a risk-based approach would give highest priority to attacking precisely the kinds of problems that most concern Bullard.23 If conventional environmental justice advocacy cannot confront risk magnitudes honestly, it cannot help much in the assessment and management of tradeoffs, either of the risk/risk or risk/benefit varieties. The notion that attacking some risks may create others is largely foreign to environmental justice—beyond a fear that attacking the risk of poverty with industrial jobs may expose workers to hazardous conditions. A focus on community inclusion, although necessary to the ultimate acceptability of decisions, offers no automatic or painless way to sort through tradeoffs.24 When confronted with choices posing both risks and benefits— such as a proposed hazardous waste treatment facility that would create jobs, and impose relatively low risks, in a needy area—environmental justice offers, along with disgust that such horrendous choices exist, mainly community engagement and participation. But because such situations tend to stimulate multiple (and often harshly raised) local voices on both sides of the issue, activists are at pains to decide where (besides additional participation and deliberation) the community's interest lies. Because an activist group will be in close touch with both the fear of toxics and the hunger for economic opportunity, the organization itself may be torn. The locally one-sided issue presents far preferable terrain for activists. It should surprise no one that activists are anxious to deemphasize community-level disagreement of this sort. Nor is it surprising to learn from the head of a prominent environmental justice organization that her group tries to avoid situations that pose precisely these locally polarizing tradeoffs.25 Faced with such tensions, environmental justice partisans may simply retreat into cant, attacking a system that facilitates "environmental blackmail," allowing disadvantaged communities to become "hooked on toxics."26

#### Their dismissal of factual refutation turns solvency

Foreman 98

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Its relatively congenial and accessible structure belies two basic limitations. One is that, like the environmental justice movement that inspired it, NEJAC is unable to define or focus on a set of policy priorities smaller than the full universe of federal, state, and local environmental justice issues. Painstakingly participatory in orientation, hopping among issues as they arise and ideas as they are generated, the council is a mechanism appropriate to conveying, and perhaps amplifying, demands, but not for deciding which ones deserve priority or how they should be compromised on behalf of other goals. like the October 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, which yielded its seventeen principles of environmental justice through political and highly ideological accumulation rather than discriminating analysis, NEJAC is not the place to look for hard thinking about the boundaries of, or potential tradeoffs embedded in, environmental justice. The prevailing council view appears to be that all communities and all voices within them are more or less equally legitimate and deserving. Accordingly, their main concern is to enhance the overall "community presence" whenever and wherever possible. That, for example, is why the council successfully prodded the EPA to allow the creation of an indigenous peoples subcommittee in 1995; several NEJAC members had long been concerned that "issues important to indigenous peoples had not been addressed adequately by the existing committee structure of NEJAC."39 The council listens sympathetically to public comments and encourages the EPA or other agencies to take action. Its focus, especially within its subcommittees, is less on health or risk than on ferreting out and elevating community perspectives. But NEJAC eschews anything like a formal comparative assessment among the claims brought before it and there is no pressure from the EPA, or from anywhere else for that matter, for it to behave otherwise. Not surprisingly, NEJACs determination to achieve maximum inclusiveness can be procedurally debilitating at times. For example, in December 1996, at NEJACs eighth meeting in Baltimore, the public comment calendar was overcrowded, as is often the case; more than thirty individuals were signed up to speak. Chairman Moore, as usual, gently and repeatedly reminded both council members and the public of the "need to move along" to get through the list. But then a pair of Native American activists offered a rambling joint presentation that ended by calling for NEJAC to help free imprisoned activist Leonard Peltier, whom many observers have long believed to have been unjustly convicted for the murder of two FBI agents. The flow of public comment immediately halted as various council members (including chairman Moore) offered damning opinions regarding Peltier's incarceration. As the council began discussing what action it might appropriately take, no one dared venture what might appear obvious: that whatever the merits of Peltier's case, an EPA advisory council was simply an inappropriate forum in which to address that issue.